Is Our Global Future Being Decided At The Secret Bilderberg Meetings- A Report 1963

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Bilderberg is a highly secretive, international think tank and some say, policy forming group which has been meeting annually since May of 1954. This is the report from 1963. Very few, less than 10, of these reports are published for the public. Notice they removed the participant list. Go here to read the one from 1980 and check out the list of participants, especially from USA.
  BILDERBERG MEETINGS CANNES CONFERENCE 29-31 March 1963 (Participant list has been moved to a separate file)INTRODUCTIONThe twelfth Bilderberg Meeting was held on 29, 30 and 31 March 1963 at the HotelMartinez, Cannes (France) under the chairmanship of H.R.H. the Prince of the Netherlands.Participants numbered ninety and represented the United States, Canada and fifteenEuropean countries together with various international organizations. They were drawn fromamong political leaders (members of governments and parliamentarians) and leading figures inbusiness, journalism, the civil service (national and international), the liberal professions andtrade-union organizations.In accordance with the rules of procedure adopted at each meeting, all participants spoke onan absolutely personal basis without committing any government or organization to whichthey might belong. In order to facilitate complete frankness, the discussions were confidentialand no representatives of the press were admitted. A short press release in which theChairman's was the only name mentioned was distributed beforehand but no further releasewas issued at the conclusion of the meeting.Three items were included on the Agenda:I - The balance of power in the light of recent international developments.II - Trade relations between the U.S.A. and Europe in the light of the negotiations for Britain's entry into the Common Market. III -Trade relations between the Western world and the developingcountries (tariffs, quotas, commodity arrangements, etc.). Ad. I Thisitem will cover changes in power relations—political, economic andmilitary— between the Communist and Western countries and insideeach group.On account of developments subsequent to the preparation of this agenda (particularly thecollapse of the Brussels negotiations between Britain and the E.E.C.) and the close connexionbetween this fact and items I and II, the Chairman asked participants:- in dealing with item I to give preference to the subject of the political and militaryrelations existing between the Western allies without thereby excluding certain currenteconomic-political problems which have arisen as a result of the failure of the Brusselsdiscussions;- in dealing with item II, to concentrate on future prospects, more especially in regardto the Kennedy Round and certain specific problems such as the co-ordination of agricultural policies.Since certain participants were absent when the meeting opened, item III was dealt with firstalthough various participants returned to this item during the last session. The srcinal order of the various items has been adhered to in the present text.In accordance with another of the Bilderberg Meetings' rules, aimed at preserving the  confidential nature of the discussions, none of the participants is mentioned by name in thepresent report.I. THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT INTERNATIONALDEVELOPMENTSIn the course of a preliminary note, H.R.H. the Prince of the Netherlands had suggested thatparticipants should concentrate more particularly on a consideration of the followingquestions:-What impact will the growing strength of Europe have on the relations between the U.S.and Europe in world affairs: competition, cooperation or partnership? What are the conditionsfor a partnership?-Is the idea of a multilateral or multinational nuclear force an answer to the troubles of theAlliance? What exactly does it mean? How is the problem of the ultimate political control of such a force to be solved?What is the relevance of this concept to the current general disarray of the alliance?Participants particularly qualified to discuss the matter were also asked to give their viewson the recent Franco-German treaty and on its role within the Common Market and theAtlantic Alliance.A written note had previously been drawn up by an Italian participant who referred to itsmain lines of argument in addressing the meeting.The failure of the Russian bluff over Cuba, wrote this participant, demonstrated,a) that there is a balance; at an extremely high level of destruction, between the militarypotential of the United States and the USSR;b) that Khrushchev recognises this fact and that, whatever he may say in public, he isprepared to accept the consequences of this balance. There was therefore reason to hope that peaceful co-existence , without open hostility, would continue for some time. This balance,argued the author of the note, was entirely based on the American deterrent independently of other national forces. At the same time, the conflict was continuing on the ideological leveland it would be ill-advised for the moment to hope too much from the Russo-Chinesedisagreements, however deep, all the more since the lack of unity within the Western worldwas also real and serious. The most important question in this connexion was that of Americanleadership. For his own part, the author of the note was in favour of accepting such leadershipunreservedly: it was, he wrote, a fact of existence, if only because America spends four timesas much on arms as all the other members of NATO combined. It followed that Americanleadership, based on the only real deterrent force against the USSR, constituted NATO'scornerstone, notwithstanding European recovery on the economic level. True, arrangementscould and should be found to render that leadership as little burdensome as possible but toreject it purely and simply could only create a dangerous neutralism, especially if it took theform of a sort of anti-colonialism directed at America.The author went on to discuss the circumstances surrounding the recent breakdown of negotiations between the United Kingdom and the E.E.C. and expressed his bitter regretconcerning them. The breakdown, he said, was a blow from which European integration mightnever recover. True, the French rejection was delivered in accordance with the provisions of the Rome Treaty which calls for unanimity among governments of the Community as regardsthe admission of new members but it ran counter to the only line of action which would enablegenuine European union to develop, namely compromise between the wishes of the variousEuropean countries, each being merely a part of a greater whole. The author of the noteconsidered that what was still more serious was the fact that, at his press conference, Generalde Gaulle should have let it be understood that the choice was not between Paris and Londonbut between Paris and Washington, on whose behalf Great Britain would have played the roleof Trojan Horse within the Common Market. In actual fact, he wrote, on the basis of theirattachment to NATO and their acceptance of American leadership, Italy and the Benelux  countries might equally well be considered as Trojan Horses .The author of the note concluded by emphasising that the Soviet threat remained as real asever and that, given Khrushchev's skill in exploiting divisions within the Western camp,complete unity was more than ever essential.Discussions on this item of the agenda revealed that the meeting could generally adhere tothe concepts advanced by the author of the note in respect of the need to remain loyal toNATO and to accept American superiority as a fact; considerable divergences of opinionbecame apparent, however, in regard to the application of those postulates now and in thefuture. A large number of speakers took up the criticism of the policy of the present Frenchgovernment which seemed, directly or indirectly, to have inspired the note. One of the Frenchspeakers observed that many of his compatriots, like himself, only partially supported Generalde Gaulle's European and Atlantic policy and, more especially, the methods sometimesemployed by the President of the Republic. Nonetheless, in his view, it would be a mistake notto avoid any reprisals or controversial statements likely to harm French national prestige. If pressure were considered necessary, it should be applied in the form of understanding andfriendship. Other French speakers argued on similar lines. A British speaker wished todissociate himself from certain criticisms levelled at the General whom he considered a greatman, a great Frenchman and even a great European.The persistence of the Soviet threat emphasised in the note was raised by severalparticipants during the discussion. A British speaker, supported by a German participant,defined the policy of the USSR as follows:-not to maintain the existing balance but to tip the scales in favour of the USSR;-for this purpose, to exploit every opportunity provided by the West. Khrushchev hadmerely recognised that this needed time. At the present time, moreover, given the fact that thesituation in Cuba, the Middle East and Africa, not to mention China, was not very favourablefrom his point of view, his primary objective remained the Western countries: Berlin was stillKhrushchev's main concern, especially if one bore in mind his apprehension regarding thepossible provision of nuclear weapons to the Federal Republic. The German speaker did not apriori include Cuba in the list of Russian defeats; it was rather that Khrushchev had wanted toavoid full-scale conflict in an area where the military conditions were particularlyunfavourable from his point of view. At the present time Khrushchev considered Cuba as apolitical bridgehead. In the German speaker's opinion, the danger still lay in Berlin.The uneasy situation currently prevailing within the Atlantic Alliance was generallyrecognised and a very large number of speakers sought to analyse the causes and thesymptoms on both sides of the Atlantic. What are the features of the Atlantic crisis? Severalparticipants attempted to define them and to recommend steps to eliminate them.The main elements brought out in the course of the discussion may be listed as followsalthough the same discussion revealed that they were closely interconnected :-the failure of the Brussels negotiations,-the doubts sometimes expressed in Europe as to the United States' determination to usetheir nuclear deterrent in support of their allies in the event of war;-the lack of balance between United States' nuclear power and the forces of its Europeanpartners and, as a result, the problems arising from American leadership;-the French determination to create an independent nuclear force and the resultingapprehension that dissemination and even proliferation of nuclear weapons might takeplace;-the divergences between the allies as to the formulas whereby the NATO Treaty might beimproved, if necessary, more especially as regards the supreme control of nuclear weapons.Although the breakdown of the negotiations for Great Britain's entry into the EuropeanEconomic Community which followed on General de Gaulle's press conference of 14 January1963 was more specifically the subject of item II of the Agenda, several participants raised thematter as early as this stage of the discussions in connexion with the uneasy situation within  the Atlantic Alliance. Recent happenings in Brussels had caused extremely sharpdisappointment in the United States and the point was emphasised by several American parti-cipants who considered that the Atlantic Alliance had suffered a blow, all the more serious inthat it was inflicted by allies. Several of the American speakers observed that Europeansperhaps failed to appreciate to the full the radical break in the United States' former traditionswhich that country's adherence to NATO represented. That adherence had now been acceptedby all sectors of American public opinion (including those who were previously the mosttraditionally isolationist, e.g. the farm voters of the Middle West) and support for theorganization had taken on an almost religious character which made any blow administered toit all the more serious. There was a great desire to achieve real unity with Europe, includingGreat Britain, via the Trade Expansion Act. There was a danger that the Brussels failure wouldrender that long-term policy illusory and the French decision struck the American public as arefusal to recognise any entity superior to the nation or even to recognise a greater commondenominator. The American public saw this as a return to isolationism, a European cartelism,and was profoundly disturbed.While all the European speakers discussing the failure of the Brussels negotiationsrecognised its harmful consequences for the Atlantic Alliance, there were some who showedthemselves anxious to reduce the question to narrower proportions. A French speaker, forinstance, considered that two problems had been confused:-a political problem in that the srcinal purpose in creating the Europe of the Six had beento enable Germany to recover its place in the concert of nations without at the same timerecovering all the elements of national sovereignty so that transfer of these to a highercommunity became necessary. At the time, this policy had been opposed both by the British asa whole and by General de Gaulle's supporters;- an economic problem arising at the Atlantic level and which should not therefore bepresented in terms of Great Britain's adherence to the Common Market. There was, in thisspeaker's view, no contradiction between a politically integrated Europe—even limited to sixmembers—and an Atlantic world co-operating closely in the military and economic fields.A Belgian participant described the 14th of January as the free world's ' 'black Monday and, more specifically, felt that the method adopted by the French government wasinadmissible because of its unilateral nature. Emphasising the community quality of theEurope to be built, implying a spirit of solidarity which went beyond individual nations, thisspeaker advanced the view that French diplomacy no longer believed in this concept andpreferred to confront its partners with a fait accompli.But a French participant belonging to the government majority group replied that thecessation of European construction dated back rather to 17 April 1962 when the FouchetPlan was rejected, a plan which represented an initial stage in that it provided for periodicalmeetings between governments, a clearly-defined organization covering defence and foreignand cultural policy which may have been modest but which could have been the embryo of agreater organization. The French attitude in January 1963, said the speaker, was solely due tothe fact that it was impossible for Great Britain to accept all the conditions of the RomeTreaty. The building of Europe meant accepting one's share of the responsibilities andburdens.Addressing the meeting again towards the close of the discussion, the Belgian speakeremphasised that, as a supporter of an integrated Europe rather than of a simple alliance, heconsidered British participation in the European institutions vital since French oppositionmade the former formula impossible.A British participant, supported by various other speakers, considered the Brusselsbreakdown to be the result of a combination of factors rather than of the French Government'sattitude alone and that the responsibility should not be attributed exclusively to the Presidentof the Republic. With the support of other speakers in the subsequent discussions (see item IIof the agenda), he argued that it was above all essential to avoid any policy calculated tohinder Great Britain's association with Europe when the time came. A number of Americanparticipants considered the contention that their determination to intervene on behalf of their
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