DDW10 General Allied Prolif (1)

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General Allied Prolif DDW2010 1 GENERAL PROLIFERATION 1NC (1/2)................................................................................................... 2 2NC LINK/INTERNAL LINK EXTENSIONS................................................................................................. 4 2NC LINK/INTERNAL LINK EXTENSIONS................................................................................................. 5 2NC LINK EXTENSIONS – PHYSICAL PRESENCE NEEDED....................
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  General Allied ProlifDDW2010 1 G ENERAL P ROLIFERATION 1NC (1/2)...................................................................................................22NC L INK  /I NTERNAL L INK  E XTENSIONS .................................................................................................42NC L INK  /I NTERNAL L INK  E XTENSIONS .................................................................................................52NC L INK  E XTENSIONS – P HYSICAL   PRESENCE   NEEDED ...........................................................................62NC L INK  E XTENSIONS – W ITHDRAWAL U NDERMINES C ONFIDENCE ...........................................................7A FF A2: U NIQUENESS (1/2)...............................................................................................................8 Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 1  General Allied ProlifDDW2010 2 General Proliferation 1NC (1/2) Forward deployment of U.S. troops is reassuring allies, but perception of commitment is wavering.Davis et al 09 (Jacquelyn Davis, Ex. VP – Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Pres. – IFPA and Prof. Int’l. Sec. Studies – Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts U. and former DODConsultant, Charles M. Perry , VP and Dir. Studies – IFPA, and James L. Schoff, Associate Dir. Asia-PacificStudies – IFPA, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis White Paper, “Updating U.S. Deterrence Concepts andOperational Planning: Reassuring Allies, Deterring Legacy Threats, and Dissuading Nuclear Wannabes ,February 2009, http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Updating_US_Deterrence_Concepts.pdf, p. 7-8)In South Korea, the United States deployed as it still does a sizable contingent of U.S. Army andAir Force troops to deter a renewed North Korean attack and to signal U.S. resolve to escalate towhatever level might be necessary to repel such an at- tack, thereby underscoring America’s extendeddeterrent commitment to the Republic of Korea (ROK). In Japan, the United States Navy has home- ported one of its aircraft carriers at Yokosuka, while the Marines deployed forces on Okinawa, theArmy at Camp Zama, and the Air Force at bases near Tokyo and Misawa, to reinforce the notion of extended deterrence. That said, the extended deterrence concept has not always seemed convincing toU.S. allies, and, were it not for the forward deployment of American troops, the willingness of theUnited States to put itself at risk to protect Allied interests would probably have been more widelyquestioned than it has been to date. Nonetheless, despite the fact that some U.S. allies, such as Franceand Israel, chose to go down the nuclear path themselves, most NATO nations, Japan, and even theROK, despite    putting into place the capacity for exercising a nuclear option should political and/or strategic circumstances change, have been satisfied that they shared with the United States a commonthreat perception and trusted that the United States would come to their defense if necessary.In the first decade of the twenty-first century, however, that satisfaction and trust is no longer agiven, and divergent threat perceptions have given rise to contending approaches to dealing withwould-be proliferators and legacy challenges. US presence key to extended deterrence – signals commitment, credibilityLayne 97 (Christopher Layne, Visiting Associate Prof. – Naval Postgraduate School, International Security;text taken from “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy”, 22:1, Summer 1997, p. 108)Deterrence theory holds that extended deterrence is strengthened when the guarantor deploys its ownmilitary forces on the protected state's territory. Thus during the Cold War, the presence of largenumbers of U.S. combat forces and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe underscored its importance tothe United States and bolstered extended deterrence's credibility. The defender's deployment of forcesis one of the most powerful factors in ensuring extended deterrence success, because it is a visiblesignal that the defender means business. 62 Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 2  General Allied ProlifDDW2010 3 General Proliferation 1NC (2/2) US physical presence, credibility key to preventing proliferation – capability not enough on its ownMcInnis 05 (Kathleen J McInnis, Coordinator of the Project on Nuclear Issues, research associate at CSIS,from Extended Deterrence: The US Credibility Gap in the Middle East published in the Washington Quarterlyin the summer of 2005)2005 pg. 180,http://www.twq.com/05summer/docs/05summer_mcinnis.pdf )Taking into consideration the potential for Egypt and Saudi Arabia to proliferate, could the UnitedStates assure Cairo and Riyadh, dissuading them from building their own nuclear weapons, byextending the U.S. nuclear umbrella? Assurance gained through a reasonably sound extendeddeterrence policy relies on two    primary factors: capability and credibility. Although the United Statesarguably possesses the physical capability to deter the Iranian regime on behalf of Gulf/Near Easternstates, whether it has sufficient political credibility needed to assure its regional allies is not clear.Without this credibility, states in the region may yet be tempted to acquire their own nuclear guarantee.What does it mean to be credible? Essentially, allies must be confident that the United States woulddefend them and their interests in the event of an act of aggression. This involves an unambiguousobligation, created through physical presence and underpinned by political commitment, to the survivalof these states and their regimes. Yet, as Cold War experience taught, establishing credibility can bedifficult. France, for example, ultimately decided that U.S. security assurances were insufficient anddecided to acquire its own nuclear deterrent. Proliferation causes nuclear war, destruction of entire nationsUtgoff 02 (Utgoff, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for DefenseAnalyses, MIT Press. Text taken from Survival Vol 44, no 2, p.90 from summer of 2002)Widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and thatsuch shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possiblewith the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world thatwill mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every oncein a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations. Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 3  General Allied ProlifDDW2010 4 2NC Link/Internal Link Extensions Presence key to deterrence and preventing proliferation. That’s the 1NC Layne and the 1NC McInnis.Warrants:a.In past, US forward deployment kept questioning of commitment at bay b.In past, most of NATO confident in US, despite ability to nuclearizec.Such confidence no longer guaranteed, fear amongst allies US forward deployment is reassuring allies, but perception of commitment wavering.Davis et al 09 (Jacquelyn Davis, Ex. VP – Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Pres. – IFPA and Prof. Int’l. Sec. Studies – Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts U. and former DODConsultant, Charles M. Perry , VP and Dir. Studies – IFPA, and James L. Schoff, Associate Dir. Asia-PacificStudies – IFPA, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis White Paper, “Updating U.S. Deterrence Concepts andOperational Planning: Reassuring Allies, Deterring Legacy Threats, and Dissuading Nuclear Wannabes ,February 2009, http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Updating_US_Deterrence_Concepts.pdf, p. 7-8)In South Korea, the United States deployed as it still does a sizable contingent of U.S. Army andAir Force troops to deter a renewed North Korean attack and to signal U.S. resolve to escalate towhatever level might be necessary to repel such an at- tack, thereby underscoring America’s extendeddeterrent commitment to the Republic of Korea (ROK). In Japan, the United States Navy has home- ported one of its aircraft carriers at Yokosuka, while the Marines deployed forces on Okinawa, theArmy at Camp Zama, and the Air Force at bases near Tokyo and Misawa, to reinforce the notion of extended deterrence. That said, the extended deterrence concept has not always seemed convincing toU.S. allies, and, were it not for the forward deployment of American troops, the willingness of theUnited States to put itself at risk to protect Allied interests would probably have been more widelyquestioned than it has been to date. Nonetheless, despite the fact that some U.S. allies, such as Franceand Israel, chose to go down the nuclear path themselves, most NATO nations, Japan, and even theROK, despite    putting into place the capacity for exercising a nuclear option should political and/or strategic circumstances change, have been satisfied that they shared with the United States a commonthreat perception and trusted that the United States would come to their defense if necessary.In the first decade of the twenty-first century, however, that satisfaction and trust is no longer agiven, and divergent threat perceptions have given rise to contending approaches to dealing withwould-be proliferators and legacy challenges. Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 4
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